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1
I. Introduction
In the small town of Truro, Massachusetts, three years had
passed and the police could still not find the killer of freelance
fashion writer Christa Worthington. Christa was found stabbed to
death with her two-year-old daughter "clinging to her body."
2
Local police found semen on Worthington's body, providing a
DNA sample, an important clue to help solve the case.3 As has
occurred on other occasions in the United States and abroad,
investigators deployed a so-called "DNA Dragnet" of all 790
males in the town.4 Police asked men in Truro to provide
investigators with a DNA sample in order to check it against the
DNA found on Worthington. While the program was voluntary,
investigators indicated that those who were unwilling to provide a
sample would be viewed with suspicion by the police.5 Sergeant
David Perry of the Truro Police Department stated, "[w]e're trying
to find that person who has something to hide." 6 In addition, the
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006. The author
wishes to thank Professor Richard Rosen for his helpful comments and
Professor D. Grier Stephenson for his continued guidance.
2 Pam Belluck, To Try to Net Killer, Police Ask a Small Town's Men for DNA,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at Al.3 id.
4 Id.; see also SAMUEL WALKER, DEPT. CRIM. JUST., U. NEB. OMAHA, POLICE
DNA "SWEEPS" EXTREMELY UNPRODUCTIVE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE
DNA "SWEEPS" (Sept. 2004) (finding that DNA dragnets are "extremely
unproductive as an investigative technique."), available at
www.policeaccountability.org/dnareport.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
5 Belluck, supra note 2, at A l (reporting that "Sgt. David Perry of the Truro
Police Department and other law enforcement authorities here say that the
program is voluntary but they will pay close attention to those who refuse to
provide DNA").6 d.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) repeated the alleged
remarks of a State Trooper, that, "[they] have an awareness of
people who fail to consent."'
The response of local residents was been mixed; some men
believed they had nothing to lose and should aid the police in
tracking down the killer by providing a DNA sample. 8 Others
were more suspicious of police action generally and had privacy
concerns. 9 The ACLU has called for an immediate stop to the
DNA collection due to privacy concerns and the fact that DNA
Dragnets like the one in Truro are typically unsuccessful.' 0 In fact,
DNA testing ultimately yielded an arrest in the Worthington case,
although the arrestee was someone the police considered a suspect
as early as 2002.11 Thus, DNA testing of those suspected by law
enforcement officials, not the generalized DNA Dragnet, led to an
arrest.
As heinous crimes have remained unsolved, investigators
have turned to wide scale DNA searches in numerous towns across
the United States in an attempt to flush out dangerous
perpetrators. After briefly reviewing the use of DNA by law
enforcement officials in the United States and discussing historic
treatment of DNA Dragnets in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
this Recent Development considers the legality of DNA Dragnets
after Caballes v. United States, a drug-sniffing dog case that may
have implications for the use of DNA technology. Moreover, this
Recent Development argues that the traditional "reasonable
expectation of privacy test" is inappropriate given the trend for
increased use of DNA by investigators and private actors; as DNA
7 Letter from John Reinstein, Legal Director, Massachusetts ACLU, to District
Attorney Michael O'Keefe, at
http://www.aclu-mass.org/Truro/Truro%20DNA%2OLetter%201-10-05.pdf
(Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 See Belluck, supra note 2, at Al. For example, one resident stated, "[m]ost
people, I think, agree that they should do whatever it takes to get the guy." Id.
9 Id. Another resident stated, "I think it's outrageous .... I really think they're
usurping my civil rights." Id.
10 Reinstein, supra note 7, at 3.
1 IPam Belluck, DNA Test Leads, at Last, to Arrest in Cape Cod Case, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 18, 2005, at Al.
12 Walker, supra note 4.
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analysis becomes more common in society, it has the potential to
open the door to prevalent, unchecked use of DNA sampling in the
absence of the protections provided either by an alternative legal
standard or statutory privacy protections.
This Recent Development proposes that Fourth
Amendment rights are inadequately protected in the face of
rampant technological change fueled by scientific developments
that were not present in the arenas of prior Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment privacy-protecting safeguards
cannot sufficiently protect against a drift into a future in which the
intimate secrets of one's body are unlocked and held by the
government for any future use. Therefore, this Recent
Development argues that prophylactic measures are necessary to
strike the proper balance between the legitimate state interest in
collecting accurate and sufficient information about the criminals
and the individual's interest in adequate protection for the vast
personal and private information contained within DNA. With
appropriate limits on what information the government may glean
from DNA samples, DNA testing and analysis on a wide scale can
balance privacy interests with the important governmental interest
of accurate law enforcement.
II. A Brief History of DNA Use in Criminal Investigations
Jim Watson and Francis Crick first understood the structure
of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") as "the informational molecule
of human heredity."' 3 Each person's DNA, with the exception of
identical twins, is different from that of every other human being. 4
All human cells contain DNA, which remains unchanged during
one's entire life. 15 DNA samples can be attained from numerous
13 James D. Watson & Francis C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids:
A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 737 (1953); see also
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC ERA, 3 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., Yale University Press 1997).
14 COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 9 (1992), at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309045878/html/.15 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, DNA EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR VICTIM SERVICE PROVIDERS, at
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bodily materials, including blood, saliva, skin tissue, saliva, sweat,
hair and bone.' 6 For example, DNA can be retrieved from the rim
of a bottle or can or from dental floss.17
Due to its uniqueness, DNA has been hailed for its high
level of certainty in the criminal investigation context.' For
example, Christopher Asplen, a federal prosecutor and former
executive director of the U.S. Justice Department's National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence stated, "[i]t's the
most significant advancement in investigative tools at least in this
[past] century." 19 Some commentators describe DNA as a panacea
in terms of exonerating the wrongly convicted innocent.2' DNA is
also routinely collected at crime scenes and used at the outset of
investigations in order to solve crime. 2'
In addition, DNA is collected and analyzed, and the
resulting DNA profiles are added to databases for predetermined
22populations. Generally, the relevant population has expanded
over time.23 While DNA was initially collected only from sex
offenders, now most states mandate DNA sampling of all
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/bc000657.pdf (Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
16 Id. at2.
17 Id. at6.
18 Kenneth Jost, DNA Databases, in CQ RESEARCHER ON CONTROVERSIES IN
LAW AND SOCIETY, 1 (CQ Press 2001). Prosecutor Asplen stated "[i]t's one of
the most accurate technologies we have." Id19 1d.
20 See James P. O'Brien Jr., DNA Fingerprinting. The Virginia Approach, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 778 (1994) (discussing problems in DNA labs such
as environmental contamination).
21 In fact, this occurred in the Truro case, where the ex-husband and father of
Worthington were both investigated, gave DNA samples, and were ruled out due
to a lack of match. See Belluck, supra note 2, at Al.22 See Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court's Primary Purpose Test: A
Roadblock to the National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1,
3-6 (2004) (providing an overview of the federal Combined DNA Index System
or CODIS); see also Warren. R. Webster, Jr., DNA Database Statutes and
Privacy in the Information Age, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (2000) (arguing that
states have failed to adequately address privacy concerns).
23 See John P. Cronon, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposal for
Complete Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 132 (Fall 2000) (documenting the
expansion of DNA databases occurring in the states).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
convicted violent felons. Moreover, a few states have enacted
legislation providing for the collection of DNA from all persons
arrested.24 According to database proponents, the expansion of
DNA databases increases the probability that police will match
DNA found at both past and future crime scenes. This would lead
to more efficient and accurate crime fighting.25 One group
lobbying for the expansion of DNA databases argues that
"[s]tatistics show that as many as half of all violent criminals have
non-violent prior convictions. If a state takes DNA from violent
offenders only, the likelihood of solving a particular rape or
murder are [sic] reduced by 85%.,,26 Similarly, in calling for such
an expansion, Paul B. Ferrara, the director of Virginia's Forensic
Science Division stated, "If we took samples from suspects at
arrest and searched a database of samples from crime scenes, the
advantages to public safety are going to be tremendous.,
27
The crime-fighting power and accuracy of DNA has driven
the expansion of DNA collection. All fifty states have DNA
Databases of some kind.28 Every state collects and enters DNA
information from all persons convicted of sex crimes into a
database. 29 As of January, 2005, a total of thirty-eight states
require DNA samples from all convicted felons.3 ° While forty-
24 id.
25 id.
26 Applied Biosystems, Forensic DNA Databases, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/DNA%20Database%20Brochure.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
27 Jost, supra note 18, at 4.
28 Id. at 6; see also State DNA Databases Laws: Qualifying Offenses, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/Table%20oP/o2OState%20DNA%2OLaws%20-
%202004.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
29 Applied Biosystems, Violent Crime Requirements, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/Murder,%20Assault%20&%20Battery%2OMap.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); see also Applied Biosystems, Sex Offender Requirements, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/Sex%200ffender/2OMap.pdf (lasted visited Jan. 30,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
30 Applied Biosystems, All Felons Requirements, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/All-Felons%20Map.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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seven states require DNA samples for criminals convicted of
murder and assault and battery, the remaining three require DNA
just for criminals convicted of murder.31
Significant privacy concerns are implicated by the use of
DNA on a wide level. While DNA has been compared to
fingerprints as a crime solving tool,32 commentators have pointed
out that DNA potentially provides vast amounts of personal
information including intimate details regarding physical health
and behavioral characteristics, 33 whereas the information from
fingerprints is simplistic: Is it a match or not? In Davis v.
Mississippi,34 the Supreme Court held that detentions premised
solely on the discovery of an arrestee's fingerprints, while subject
to the Fourth Amendment's protections, benefit from a sometimes-
relaxed notion of probable cause.35 The Court reasoned that
"[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious
intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches
and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into
an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an
interrogation or search.",36 While DNA can be used to discern
whether a person's DNA matches that left at a crime scene, it also
may reveal information of a highly intimate and personal nature,
31 Applied Biosystems, Violent Crime Requirements, supra note 29.
32 Thomas F. Wider, Privacy Protection is Needed for DNA, 2002 LAW REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 927, 928 (2002).
33 See Jill C. Shaefer, Profiling at the Cellular Level: The Future of New York
State DNA Databanks, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 576 (2004); see also
Maya Harris, American Civil Liberties Union, Proposition OKs Seizing, Storing
DNA of Innocent People, at http://www.aclunc.org/opinion/040805-dna.html
(July 28, 2004 ) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Harris describes DNA as
[m]ore than just a "fingerprint," which merely provides a
method of identification[;] your DNA exposes the most
intimate details about you and your family. DNA reveals your
entire genetic makeup, ancestry, susceptibility to or carrier
status for certain diseases. Studies claim to link genetic
markers with Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, drug use, and sexual
orientation.
Id.
34 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
35 Id. at 727.
36 id.
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including an individual's propensity to get certain diseases and
behavioral characteristics.37 As technology progresses, scientific
advances will beget further analysis of the person from his or her
DNA.
III. The Fourth Amendment and DNA
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.38
The Constitution's framers enacted the Fourth Amendment in
order to prevent warrantless physical searches of personal
residences by agents of the government. 39 Its contours have
extended well beyond the protection of the home to include other
areas; it has been applied in settings ranging from the basic search
and seizure of persons,40 to the use of drug sniffing dogs during a
routine traffic stop4 1 and drug testing of students.
4
The threshold Fourth Amendment question is whether a
certain government action is a constitutional search or seizure. If
state actions do not constitute a search or seizure, Fourth
37 Webster, Jr., supra note 22, at 139 ("Although DNA might not provide the
key to unlocking the human personality, it does contain information that could
be damaging to donors because of the unknown potential as an indicator for
other aspects of human life, from behavior to disease.")
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39 David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the Original
Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263, 270
(2003) (compiling the existing literature and documentary evidence on the
historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the sole
purpose was to protect residences).40 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974) (describing Fourth Amendment law).
41 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837-3 8 (2005).
42 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1995).
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Amendment protections such as probable cause and reasonableness
do not apply and the government may proceed without any
particularized suspicion that that person is involved in a crime.4
For example, it is not a "search" if the police are in a place where
they have a legal right to be and they observe contraband in plain
view.44 Next, if governmental action is considered a search that
implicates the Constitution, is it unreasonable, and therefore
impermissible? 45 Whether a governmental intrusion is reasonable
depends on a balancing of law enforcement interests against the
individual's security and privacy interests at stake in the particular
setting .6
The modern foundational case for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is Katz v. United States. 47 In Katz, the police utilized
an electronic listening and recording device on the exterior of a
public telephone booth to listen to and record the conversation of a
suspect involved in illegal gambling.48 The Supreme Court
provided that:
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.49
Thus, the Court reasoned that the "[g]overnment's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure'
43 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
44See id. ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also
Howard E. Wallin, Plain View Revisted, 22 PACE L. REv. 307 (2002) (analyzing
the development of the plain view exception to Fourth Amendment strictures).
41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he expectation [of privacy
must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
46 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
4' 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48Id. at 348-49.
4 9 Id. at 351.
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment., 50 In short, the new
test established that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when,
from an objective standpoint, a person had a reasonably justifiable
expectation of privacy.
In Greenwood v. California,51 the Supreme Court held that
a search and seizure of garbage bags left at the curb outside a
house without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment "only if
the respondents manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in
their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable." 52 The
Greenwood Court, using the Katz rationale, concluded that since it
was "common knowledge" that garbage bags on a public street are
able to be accessed and publicly inspected, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in anything discarded.53 Thus, because
society does not consider publicly-discarded garbage to be private,
the government may permissibly search and seize it without
triggering the restrictions of the Constitution. In short, the post-
Greenwood inquiry by courts is whether there is a "societal
understanding that certain areas deserve [more] scrupulous
protection from government invasion.",
54
The Supreme Court has applied the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" approach in a variety of contexts. In Oliver v. United
States, 5 the Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in open fields since they are usually exposed to the
public.56 The Oliver Court reasoned that intimate activities do not
occur in open fields.57 Thus, there is no societal expectation of
privacy. In United States v. Dioniso,58 the Court reiterated and
extended the principle that the Fourth Amendment provides no
protection for what a person knowingly and constantly exposes to
the public such as the tone and manner of one's voice.5 9 Thus, the
50 d. at 353.
" 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
12 Id. at 39.
"I d. at 40.54 Id. at 43 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
15 466 U.S. 170 (1984).56 Id. at 178.
I !d. at 179.
58410 U.S. 1 (1973).
"Id. at 14.
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Court reasoned "[n]o person can have a reasonable expectation that
others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world. 6 °
DNA shares some key similarities with both garbage and
an individual's voice. DNA is constantly discarded by all people.6'
Unlike one's voice, which can be heard by those nearby, the
quantities of information contained within one's DNA require
sophisticated scientific analysis to unlock any information. 62 Thus,
the average member of the public could not, without sophisticated
expertise and considerable resources, take the DNA sample of a
neighbor and get any meaningful information from it. The highly
personal information that is revealed after analysis of one's DNA
is never exposed to the public without the aid of modem
technological tools. Only on a technical level is DNA constantly
discarded and exposed to the public for collection and analysis.
One commentator argues that garbage is different from DNA since
it takes an affirmative act of throwing away one's trash, whereas
DNA is discarded, arguably unconsciously. 63 Courts nonetheless,
remain reluctant to stop law enforcement from utilizing discarded
DNA samples.64
Since DNA is constantly discarded, absent other privacy
safeguards, only the cost and complexity of analyzing samples
stand between the routine collection of DNA samples from the
citizenry at large. First, as DNA databases gain acceptance as a
crime fighting tool in the United States, the fact that they are
common bolsters the case for the use of DNA as a reasonable
means to fight crime. Societal expectations are shaped accordingly
which affects the reasonableness of the use of databases in Fourth
60 id.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
62 See Paul E. Tracy, Ph.D., & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother andHis Science
Kit: DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000) (discussing the use of DNA technology to exonerate
the innocent, its use as a prosecutorial tool, and future scenarios for DNA
database expansion).
63 Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REv. 413, 437-38 (2001).
64 See Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to
Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples 54 DuKE L.J. 179, 193 (2004).
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Amendment analysis. Next, it has been posited that DNA
Databases in Great Britain are subject to so-called "function
creep," whereby DNA taken for one purpose is later used for
additional unrelated purposes.65 For instance, DNA samples under
the British Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 could only
be taken from those who were suspected of committing a serious
crime. 66 When the police initially took a DNA sample, certain
safeguards were in place, including the mandatory destruction of
the DNA sample if the crime was later deemed not to be serious or
if the person was not suspected or prosecuted or ultimately was
acquitted.67 This law has since been periodically amended,
moving to the present standard where DNA samples can be
retained indefinitely when "taken from a person in connection with
the investigation of an offence," which is akin to the trend in the
United States of taking DNA from all arrestees. 68 In Great Britain,
where DNA data-basing was pioneered and has won widespread
acceptance, the House of Lords recently upheld the most recent
amendment, ruling that DNA taken from people who are not
charged with an offence or are acquitted can be held indefinitely
by the police. 69 Similar trends have occurred in the United States
with both fingerprinting during the World War 1I era and
contemporarily with the expansion of DNA sampling described
above. 70 Relaxation of privacy safeguards is a striking trend
considering that the Court's protection of privacy turns on what
society reasonably expects to be private. As has been the case in
Great Britain, investigators' frequent use of DNA databases may
make it difficult for the judiciary to stop the momentum
encouraging extensive DNA sweeps.
65 Pamela Sankar, DNA-Typing: Galton's Eugenic Dream Realized?, in
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN
THE MODERN WORLD 278 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey, eds.) (2001).
66 Statewatch News Online, UK: Police Can Keep DNA of Innocent People
Indefinitely, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/sep/03uk-dna-
database.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).67 Id.
68 id.
69 id.
70 See Sankar, supra note 65, at 278-79.
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Society's expectation of privacy regarding DNA in a
Fourth Amendment context may also be relaxed as the use of DNA
sampling and analysis become more commonplace. As police use
of highly personal information increases, the reasonableness of
expecting such information would be kept private may decrease.7'
In addition, when persons provide information to a third party, the
Court has held there is a lessened expectation of privacy in that
information if the providers know of the types of details being
72exposed. The commercial utilization of human DNA has rapidly
expanded, placing large quantities of intimate details in the
possession of third parties, arguably reducing society's expectation
of privacy in such information:
[t]he genes that cause a number of serious
hereditary diseases have been identified, leading to
the development of genetic tests that could predict
predisposition to disease prenatally; gene therapy
trials have begun to test methods for fixing genetic
flaws directly; and pharmaceutical companies have
started to use genetic information as a guide to
discovering new and more-effective drugs.73
While commercial users may not be interested in ascertaining the
identity of individuals, the collection process can be similar and
companies will have access to individuals' highly personal
information, irregardless of whether they actually use such
intimate details for commercial purposes. While commercial DNA
use is not subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment,
expansion of commercial use may affect both societal expectations
71 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the contours of [the Court's] new rule are uncertain because its
protection dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is in 'general public use'
.... 11).
69 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that all telephone users
realize they convey numerical information to the phone company and that the
phone company can and does record such information for numerous purposes).
73 William Loob, Genome Project Probes for Secrets of Human DNA, at
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/99/O9/OO4.html (Sept. 1999) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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of privacy and whether the Court will deem those expectations to
be reasonable.
Much of the Court's jurisprudence thus far has focused on
avoiding actual physical intrusions into an individual's body to
attain samples. For example, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,74
Justice Scalia provided that the taking of a urine test is the only act
that would constitute a search, whereas the testing of the sample is
not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.75 Protections
based on the intrusion stage are inadequate because DNA can be
attained without any actual bodily intrusion. The level of bodily
intrusion necessary to obtain a sample has been central to the
Court's analysis in the administrative context, whereby the
government must articulate some "special need" for the
information aside from general crime control.76 In Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives'Ass 'n,77 the Court held that a federal
agency could require drug and alcohol testing of employees under
the Fourth Amendment in order to protect public safety and
required no reasonable suspicion.78 The Court permitted a
"physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, [which] infringes
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable., 79 In addition, the Skinner Court stated that the
chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is an
additional invasion of the employee's privacy interests.8 ° While
the standards for determining whether searches are permissible
under the Fourth Amendment in the administrative context, the
administrative context has provided a forum for the Court to weigh
in on the governmental intrusion into the body in different settings,
which is alarming considering the lack of intrusion associated with
getting a DNA sample.
One commentator accepts that one does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in something that he or she
14 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
75 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 81-84 (2001) (describing the policy of testing pregnant mothers for
illicit drug use to aid in law enforcement context).
77 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
78 Id. at 633.
79 1d. at 616.
80 id.
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"knowingly exposes to the public," 8' but she distinguishes "the
taking of blood, fingernail scrapings, pubic hair samples, breath
samples, and X-rays" since they take some form of governmental
intrusion into one's body in order to gain access to the
information. 82 Although DNA samples can be attained from
blood, fingernails or pubic hair, a physical intrusion is not
necessary to obtain a DNA sample; hair, flakes of skin, and the like
are constantly shed by all human beings. 83 In the Truro,
Massachusetts case that begins this article, investigators could ask
to see the license of each person who refuses to consent to provide
DNA and if it is voluntarily given, swab it for a DNA sample. The
Supreme Court recently held that the police may require that a
person identify himself to an officer without implicating the Fourth
Amendment protections. 84 This decision raises an interesting
question: Can the police return to their patrol car and take a
sample from one's license on a routine traffic stop since the person
has effectively handed the officer his or her DNA? In addition,
once the police gain a sample voluntarily, the police may
subsequently "use [it] for whatever evidence it may contain. 8 5
81 Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 351 (1967).
82 Ellen Alderman, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 852, 856 (1986).
83 See Harlan, supra note 64, at 194. Harlan argues that
[a]dvances in science have rendered DNA ostensibly
indiscriminate from such "delicate materials" discarded in
public places. DNA is present on any item touched by an
individual; it exists in hair, which is shed in public, and in
saliva, such that it may be gathered from any used cup, straw,
or spoon.
Id.
84 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004).85 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 95 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. Illinois v. Caballes: Suggesting Government-Imposed
DNA Database Limits to Balance Fourth Amendment
Concerns
In 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the use of drug
sniffing dogs by the police at road checkpoints in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond.86 The Court found that "the general
interest in crime control" was not a valid reason to allow stops
"justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that
interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime." 87 This past term, the Court drew a fine
line in Illinois v. Caballes,88 which involved the use of a drug
sniffing dog, not at a check point, but instead during a routine
traffic stop.89 The Court held that "[t]he use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog-one that does not expose noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view-
during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate
privacy interests."90 In short, since canine sniffs disclose only the
presence or absence of contraband items, and there is no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in having something
illegal, the government may utilize canine sniffs for drugs at will
so long as the person is stopped or seized for some legitimate
reason under the Fourth Amendment. The Court distinguished the
Caballes factual setting from that of Kyllo, where infrared
technology could be used to reveal intimate details about the
interior of a home such as "at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath," rather than just the presence
of absence of heat lamps to grow drugs.
91
The Court's decision in Caballes, unlike that in Edmonds,
did not turn on the presence or absence of any individualized
suspicion, but rather on the limited nature of the information which
can be attained from a drug dog sniff. It is arguable that Edmonds
86 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
87 Id. at 44.
88 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
89 I d. at 836.
90 Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
91 Id. at 838 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001)).
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provided greater protection under the Fourth Amendment because
persons were seized solely to be checked for drugs, whereas in
Caballes, the person was lawfully seized in connection with a
speeding citation. Thus, Caballes stands for the notion that once
the police are in valid contact with a citizen, they may utilize
technology that merely signals the presence or absence of
contraband, thereby minimizing any privacy concerns according to
the Court.
In the DNA context, Caballes may offer some guidance in
defining the permissible scope for the collection of DNA samples
and the use of databases. Since persons do not have an interest in
the presence or absence of contraband, the government may be
able to utilize dog sniffs, at any time.92 DNA databases, if
properly designed, can be akin to a drug sniffing dog, in that stored
DNA profiles can merely be used in a binary fashion. Unlike in
Kyllo, where there is no way to delineate whether the heat
emanating from one's roof is from illegal activity or intimate legal
activity, 93 with proper privacy protections, DNA analysis can be
limited to whether or not a match is present. Certain safeguards
would be required: DNA profiles can be created in an anonymous
fashion (all personal identifiers are removed), can be coded in a
fashion that will not allow the gleaning of additional private
information, and can be returned to the provider of the sample
upon a negative match with the sample of interest. The existing
database would contain a DNAprofile such as the one used in the
federal DNA database system. 9Numerous commentators have
argued that the return or destruction of DNA samples is a key in
protecting the privacy rights of the person sampled. 95 With these
92See Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is
nothing to stop the police from doing drug sniffs in parking garages or along
public streets).
93 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (2001).
94 See Carnahan, supra note 22, at 3-6 (describing the DNA Identification Act of
1994 and the creation of the CODIS system, which is designed to solve crimes
with no suspect or to identify multiple crimes committed by the same person).
95 See Harlan, supra note 64, at 179 (arguing for mandatory destruction of DNA
samples on a property theory); Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding ofAmerica:
Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2277, 2321 (2002) (stating
that samples should be destroyed or returned to the donors).
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types of safeguards in place, the police can use DNA in a binary
fashion similar to the use of a drug sniffing dog: Is the person's
DNA a match with that of the person who committed a crime? In
this way, DNA sampling and the inclusion of DNA profiles in
databases is akin to fingerprinting, which allows the police to
merely make simple matches.
96
Under the Court's reasoning in Caballes, if one does not
have a protected interest in the presence or absence of contraband,
it is hard to discern any reason that the presence or absence of a
DNA match would invoke a greater level of protection, assuming
adequate safeguards are employed. In effect, just as a dog sniff
reveals no information other than the presence of a substance that
no individual has any right to possess, DNA Databases can be
designed so that they reveal no information other than that which
the person has no right to possess, namely whether or not he
committed a crime.97 Similarly, in United States v. Jacobsen,98
Justice Stevens wrote that "[a] chemical test that merely discloses
whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."99 Unlike in
Jacobsen where negative test results "reveal[] nothing of special
interest," 00 DNA analysis can unlock vast quantities of highly
personal information in addition to whether or not a suspect
committed a crime if adequate safeguards are not employed.
An important difference is that just because an individual
left DNA at a crime scene does not necessarily prove that they
committed the crime, and therefore, they may have a greater
privacy interest. In the Truro, Massachusetts case, investigators
are interested in speaking with the person who left semen on the
victim as they believe he is the last person to have seen the victim
alive, not necessarily that the person committed the crime per se. lThis person could very well have had consensual sex with the
96 But see Grand, supra note 95, at 2323 n.52 (providing differences between
fingerprints and DNA analysis).
97 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
9 9 Id. at 123.
100 Id.
101 Belluck, supra note 2, at Al.
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victim, meaning that his interest is not merely binary in fashion-
whether or not he committed the crime.
The governmental need for the information will be weighed
against the rights of the individual for privacy. In the Truro case,
both the governmental interest and the personal interest of the
individual are high, but the governmental interest would likely be
deemed more important due to the weighty need to gather key
information, such as the identity of the person that had intercourse
with a victim in the hours before she was killed, in order to solve a
dangerous crime. In addition, a similar criticism would apply to
fingerprint databases, which courts have found to be universally
permissible even though the fingerprints of people who did not
actually commit the crime may be found at the crime scene. These
concerns do not arise in cases where the victim is alive and able to
attest to the fact that the perpetrator left the DNA sample at issue.
In this setting, the DNA sweep has the potential to be purely binary
in nature.' 
02
In order for DNA testing to truly be binary in nature,
certain safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that the test
outcome is accurate. There is an inherent risk that the underlying
data will not match the DNA report provided at the end. 10 3 Peter
Neufeld, co-founder of the Innocence Project has remarked:
We would be much better off if forensic science
was primarily a science as opposed to something
that is run by police departments. In all other
scientific disciplines it's considered crucial that the
person who is doing the test does the test blindly.
In other words he doesn't know how the result is
supposed to turn out. 104
In DNA testing, the laboratories are generally closely linked to
police departments, which has arguably lead to shoddy quality
102 For a discussion of the differences between fingerprints and DNA samples,
see Grand, supra note 95, at 2288 n.52.
103 Talk of the Nation: Expanding Criminal DNA Databases (NPR radio
broadcast, Nov. 5, 2004) at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4152449.
l1°4 Id"
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control in some cases and outright fraud in others.10 5 In addition,
police investigators have been charged with providing access to
DNA to outsiders for numerous reasons.'
6
One key solution is for state legislatures to require the use
of independent laboratories for DNA testing. Impartial scientific
analysis would go a long way toward ensuring accurate test
results.10 7 The Caballes majority implicitly allowed some level of
inaccuracy with drug sniffing dogs, by stating that the sniff was sui
generes in the face of evidence that the dogs often "alerted" to the
presence of drugs wrongly. 10 8 These erroneous results could then
provide the police with grounds to invade persons' "'intimate
details' without revealing contraband.. .. ,'09 Thus, the Caballes
Court held that drug sniffs only reveal the presence or absence of
contraband in the face of the evidence that "[t]he infallible dog...
is a creature of legal fiction."' 110 Therefore, if additional safeguards
were employed such as mandatory independent laboratory testing,
the fact that the testing procedures did not reach absolute
infallibility would not be fatal, just as the lack of fallibility of the
dogs did not prevent their suspicionless sniffs. Flawless testing
procedures would be difficult to achieve and maintain over time."'
One difference is that as between drug sniffs and DNA testing, the
105 See, e.g., Richard Willing, Mueller Defends Crime Lab After Questionable
DNA Tests, USA TODAY, May 1, 2003, at 3A (discussing questionable DNA test
results due to shortcuts taken by an employee). See generally Ellen Perlman,
Evidence of Failure, GOVERNING MAG., Apr. 2004, at 39 (discussing problems
at several labs, including the sizable workloads that have led to shortcuts and
questionable DNA test results).
106 See Harris, supra note 33 ("Law enforcement officials have been charged
with using confidential government databases to check up on a spouse, sell
information to third parties for profit, and for other unauthorized uses.").
107 See Talk of the Nation, supra note 103.
108 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 839 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
'
09 Id. at 840.
"O Id. at 839.
111 See Laura K. Donohue, Proposition 69 Could Threaten Privacy ofDNA, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 22, 2004, at E3 ("Perhaps of greatest concern is the
very real possibility of error. A recent Stanford University study showed that
even sophisticated laboratories exhibit up to a 3 percent error rate in the
handling and coding of genetic material."), available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
in/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/08/22/ING8689JT61 .DTL.
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results of an erroneous test on the average citizen may be quite
disparate; the innocent person stopped and searched for drugs
incorrectly is subjected to an arguably minor inconvenience,
whereas a person erroneously identified as the perpetrator of the
crime will likely be subjected to arrest and interrogation and
perhaps even public scorn. This bolsters the need for airtight
safeguards, or in the alternative, provides a grounds to distinguish
DNA testing from a dog sniff.
As mentioned above, another key difference is that without
the imposition of limits on the types of information that
government can gain from a DNA sample, one's DNA can be
analyzed for numerous other things such as the presence or
absence of a match with crime-scene DNA. Police investigators
have been reluctant to self-impose limitations on the types of
analysis of DNA.1 12 As Steinhart of the ACLU has stated:
We asked the folks in the criminal justice agencies
who say they want to collect an ever wider scope of
DNA records if they are willing to destroy the DNA
afterwards, just keep the test results that can be used
for the purpose of establishing identity and they've
refused. Now that tells you that they want it for
something else. And it will inevitably be used for
something else." 
3
Therefore, state legislators should be forward thinking and enact
legislation limiting the analysis that may be done on DNA samples
taken without suspicion from members of the public, as was done
in Truro, Massachusetts. These measures would provide a basis
for the argument that DNA sampling is sui generes in nature and
ought be analogized to a drug sniffing dog. Without these limits
though, the risk of the governmental intrusion on intimate personal
details is too great. DNA profiles can also be used to determine
parentage, which undermines the binary nature of DNA testing." 4
The threat of the use of DNA profiles for this additional purpose
112 Talk of the Nation, supra note 103.
l13 id.
114 See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767, 787-88 (1999) (describing
paternity testing implications that arise with DNA analysis).
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undermines the Caballes analogy, a concern which would be
alleviated with safeguards. A consideration of these safeguards
has been discussed in detail elsewhere115 and is beyond the scope
of this Recent Development.
A looming threshold question, as discussed previously, is
whether taking discarded DNA evidence is a search.1 6 If not, the
Fourth Amendment alone may be inadequate to protect the privacy
of individuals. If the collection of discarded DNA is not deemed a
search, the government is able to obtain intimate and sensitive
personal information with impunity.
An additional, non-Fourth Amendment basis for
constitutional control over DNA databases arises in the context of
a right to informational privacy. 117 The seminal case, Whalen v.
Roe,118 provided that part of a right of privacy includes "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
.... ,,119 In this case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the privacy
threat "implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files.' 20 Likewise in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives'Ass 'n, 121 the Court concluded that chemical analysis of
urine, like blood, "can reveal a host of private medical facts about
an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic.' 22 Thus, persons have a legally cognizable privacy
interest in this information, which was part of the Court's rationale
115 Id.
116 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-56 (1979) (holding that looking at
record of phone numbers dialed is not a search due to a lack of societal
expectation of privacy).
117 See Stephen Aaron Silver, Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond.: Should the Federal
Courts Recognize a Right to Physician-Patient Confidentiality?, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1809, 1813-21 (1998) (describing the historic development of an
informational right to privacy).
118 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
1 9 Id. at 599.
120 Id. at 605.
121 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
122 Id. at 617.
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in providing Fourth Amendment protection by deeming the act of
retrieving a urine sample a search.
123
Similarly, DNA databases contain vast quantities of
personal information. The Whalen Court cited the need for
appropriate safeguards as enacted by the legislature to protect
privacy in this context, paralleling what is necessary to protect
privacy interests in personal information in DNA databases. DNA
Databases are in a period of expansion and tough safeguards must
be required by the Court in order to protect privacy interests
implicated under the Fourth Amendment as well as the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights as embodied in Griswold v. Connecticut. 124 In
Griswold, Justice Douglas cited numerous provisions of the Bill of
Rights which, taken together, "[bore] witness that the right of
privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one. 125
One possible manner in which to begin to respect these privacy
notions would be for the Supreme Court to draw on the reasoning
of Caballes and apply a prophylactic rule that the use of DNA
taken from members of the general public is subject to safeguards
that would ensure that DNA attained by the police would be
utilized in a binary nature. As the collection and analysis of DNA
becomes more widespread, this may be a way to balance the rights
of the individual with the societal need for law enforcement.
Another option is to employ a property rights model, whereby
persons would have a right to the physical sample taken from them
as well as the information it contains.'
26
V. Conclusion
While America has been enamored with the use of DNA to
put the guilty behind bars and free the innocent, advances in DNA
technology, if unchecked, pose tremendous risks to personal bodily
privacy. While DNA can be collected and analyzed in a fashion
123 This again begs the question: If the urine was discarded by the person in a
public place in a manner in which the police could gain access to it, would it be
dubbed discarded waste in which there is no expectation of privacy?
124 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125 Id. at 485.
126 See Harlan, supra note 64, at 198-201.
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that does protect privacy concerns, present trends allow for wider
use of DNA in the United States and abroad, especially for the
advancements in commercial uses of DNA. As DNA analysis
becomes more commonplace in American society, the reasonable
expectation of privacy can be eroded. Employing a Caballes like
analysis to DNA Databases is an initial way to ensure that in towns
like Truro, Massachusetts, when DNA samples are taken, the
police only analyze information in which the person has no privacy
interest. The reasoning in Caballes may pave the way for the
widespread use of powerful modem technology to gather
investigative information about ordinary citizens on a large
scale. 127 While this may cause concern among civil libertarians
and other detractors of wide scale DNA database use, Caballes
also poses a way to check the current DNA tide in a fashion that
maximizes its crime-fighting power, while significantly blunting
the wide potential of DNA to reveal each person's secrets. While
Caballes may signify the Court's acceptance of powerful
technologies under the Fourth Amendment, it also suggests
limitations on the way in which information may be managed and
manipulated by the Government. Both the judicial and legislative
branches should employ strict limitations on DNA analysis in
order to balance privacy concerns with the important governmental
interest of assuring that the guilty are convicted and the innocent
are exonerated. Such measures will provide privacy protections
even though DNA is discarded by all and the government
effectively has open access to it. Thus, society can benefit from
the accuracy and power of DNA when used as a crime fighting
tool, while some privacy concerns of the citizenry are addressed.
127 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Brennan stated,
It is certainly true that a surveillance technique that identifies
only the presence or absence of contraband is less intrusive
than a technique that reveals the precise nature of an item ....
But by seizing on this distinction alone .... [the Court] may
very well have paved the way for technology to override the
limits of law in the area of criminal investigation.
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